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Abstract. Today, third-party JavaScript resources are indispensable
part of the web platform. More than 88% of world’s top websites include
at least one JavaScript resource from a remote host. However, there is a
great security risk behind using a third-party JavaScript resource, if an
attacker can infect one of these remote JavaScript resources all websites
those have included the script would be at risk.
In this paper, we present JSSignature, an entirely at the client-side pure
JavaScript framework in order to validate third-party JavaScript resources
using digital signature. Therefore, all included JavaScript resources are
checked against the integrity, authentication and non-repudiation risks
before the execution. In contrary to existing methods, JSSignature pro-
tects web pages regardless of third-party resource infection nature while
it does not set any restrictions on trusted JavaScript providers. This
approach has an acceptable one-time performance overhead and is an
easily deployable add-in. We have validated the proposed solution by
applying tests on an implemented version1.
Keywords: Web Application Security . Digital Signature . Security
Architecture . Script Inclusion.
1 Introduction
In recent years, web platform has become the primary platform on the Internet,
and sequentially one of the most important software ecosystems. There is a
significant interest in making rich client-side web applications, thanks to the new
browser features and the overall demand. There are many good reasons to make
rich client-side dynamic web applications. For example, HTML5 has introduced
1 The source-code, resources and the working demo are available at
http://iasbs.ac.ir/˜ansari/jssignature/demo.html
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lots of useful features such as Web Workers [24] and Canvas [27] which has made
HTML as an appealing client-side platform for developers.
To provide rich client-side web pages, JavaScript as a dynamic client-side
programming language is inseparable part of all modern web applications. Ac-
cording to [29], in 2014 87.8% of all websites are using JavaScript as a client-side
language.
Each single web page can include several external JavaScript resources. A
developer may include third-party JavaScript libraries to unlock some features
and advantages. For instance, using external JavaScript libraries for visitor
statistics and analysis purposes are popular (e.g., Google Analytics, Woopra).
Developers may use JavaScript libraries to improve user experience or make
client-side programming easier (e.g., jQuery, MooTools, AngularJs). Recently,
social media services have provided third-party JavaScript libraries to integrate
social features within websites (e.g. Facebook Like and sharing, Google+1).
There are two methods to include a JavaScript resource: (1) developer can
make a clone of JavaScript library and serve it from his server, (2) and the
second method is to include it from the vendor’s server as a third-party-hosted
JavaScript; The webpage visitor web browser will download the script from the
third-party server.
In most cases developers prefer the latter to achieve its advantages: (1) CDNs
and caching are major enthusiasm to use third-party hosted JavaScript library.
Using a shared JavaScript host for popular libraries will decrease the page loading
time in all websites those include a shared resource. The web browser will use a
cached version of a JavaScript library instead of downloading it again for each
website. (2) On the other hand, the use of a self-hosted clone of a library would
increase maintenance cost since JavaScript libraries may be updated regularly.
By each update, all websites need to keep their libraries updated manually by
uploading the latest version of the libraries to their resource provider. (3) Content
request distribution is another reason to use remotely hosted resources. A website
owner may decide to host its website static resources in different networks or by
a CDN provider to decrease the local web server stress, cost or load time. (4)
After all, using a self-hosted JavaScript resource is impossible when the used
third-party service is based on the frequent JavaScript resource updates (e.g.
Google Tag Manager).
For each visitor, the eligible website may include some JavaScript codes from
different vendors. All these JavaScript codes will be downloaded and executed in
client’s browsers with the same permission of the eligible web page, in a same
execution space. Consequently, the third-party JavaScript codes has a full access
to the web page DOM and other resources in the client-side.
Regarding the prevalence of third-party JavaScript libraries usage, based on
a recent research, 88.45% of world’s top 10,000 websites are using at least one
remote JavaScript library [18]. The tremendous growth in web-based applications
has made web platform a major target for hackers.
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As demonstrated in Figure 1, if an attacker could insert an infected code
into a third-party JavaScript resource, then all eligible websites that include the
infected resource will be faced with serious security risks.
The situation will become worse by spread of particular third-party JavaScript
providers those are used by thousands of world top websites. According to a
report in 2014, there are about 11 million websites those are just using Google
Hosted Libraries as a CDN JavaScript provider [2]. It has become a serious
security breakpoint for the whole web ecosystem. A possible attack on the hosted
JavaScript on this CDN, will endanger millions of people information on all
websites those are using these libraries. As an example, the hypothetical attacker
is able to hijack the visitor session by using a few lines of code injected to a
third-party library, to get all credit card details on payment pages or track login
details of visitors through cookies or DOM manipulation in all websites that are
using the vulnerable hosted JavaScript resource.
Moreover, there are also more abuse cases which will make the third-party
library as an appealing target for attackers. They can exploit recent browser
vulnerabilities or distribute malware by drive-by-downloads attacks through
JavaScript codes in millions of websites and clients just by attacking to a single
host. The mentioned reasons will make all third-party JavaScript providers as an
appealing target for attackers.
The only inhibiting factor related to this issue which is implemented in all
modern web browsers is Same-Origin Policy (SOP). SOP permits each page’s
script to access all resources on same origin [26]. In other words, it will eliminate
any DOM request from the script in website A to website B. By including
JavaScript from Website B in website A, it will be treated as a script that belongs
to website A, therefore it has a full permission to all elements and resources in
website A, and SOP would not prevent any risk. Therefore, it is not designed to
solve the included third-party JavaScript security concern.
To clarify, by injecting the infected code into a benign third-party JavaScript
resource, the attacker is able to simply steal all the private information. He can
transfer data using indirect communication methods such as creating an image
or script element on the fly with custom URL containing private information as
a URL query. SOP has no suggestion to protect the webpage from a third-party
JavaScript inclusion infection.
Several studies have been presented to tackle the before mentioned security
threat of third-party JavaScript resources. A recent study [18] has discussed
two countermeasures to be protected from third-party JavaScript threats: (1)
Proper sandboxing of third-party JavaScript, (2) Using local copy and avoid
using third-party hosted scripts. All solutions are around sandboxing or limiting
execution of third-party JavaScript. They are working in different ways, (1) JSand
[1], WebJail [23], ConScript [14], AdJail [11] and AdSentry [31] provide a refined
access control for JavaScript to define access policies for each library, (2) Caja
[16], ADsafe [4] and GateKeeper [7] are dedicated to make a safe sub-language
by rewriting the script into a safe subset of codes and scripts or compare the
script with a safe subset [4].
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Fig. 1. Security concern. Infection of a third-party JavaScript will endanger all web
applications those are using the third-party library, consequently all web application
users are in danger.
However, the proposed solutions have severe drawbacks about solving the
discussed security issues, (1) abusing trusted policies is the main concern. An
attacker can utilize current whitelisted operations to do the attack, (2) also
defining policies for each library need to know all eligible usages. Detecting all the
functionalities of a large JavaScript library even if be possible, is a time consuming
task. Moreover, in real world applications, trusted vendor may change his script
time by time to add or remove features. They may completely rewrite the script
to improve it. So, the policies may change over time. Consequently, keeping
policies up-to-date will vanish the major advantage of third-party JavaScript
regarding the decreased maintenance cost, (3) all suggested solutions are trying
to implement a method similar to a firewall between web page and third-party
JavaScript. At the end, they are restricting the benign third-party JavaScript
functionality all the time due to the risk of possible attack to the vendor. (4)
Moreover, some proposed methods require browser modification [14, 23, 31]
which is not desirable in this case. All the web application users should install
a modified browser to be protected against this kind of attacks. (5) Majority
of the suggested workarounds have a significant process overhead because of
complicated preprocessing or runtime monitoring which is not suitable for heavy
JavaScript libraries, (6) After all, even if we solve the above mentioned issues,
possible vulnerability in these proposed solutions will remain a concern [13]. There
is no guarantee these methods are invulnerable against all malicious JavaScript
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codes as their protective method is dependent on the included JavaScript codes
functionality.
This paper presents JSSignature, a novel method to bring digital signatures to
third-party JavaScript to eliminate security concern around third-party JavaScript
inclusion. This method is inspired by a recent study on the prevalence of third-
party JavaScript usage and current security obstacles [18].
This paper makes the following contributions in the field:
1. It introduces JSSignature as a simple and straight-forward method that: (1)
works without defining policies, consequently white-listed rules abuse is no
longer disputable, (2) can work with all libraries and scripts independent
of future updates without time consuming settings, (3) completely protect
third-party JavaScript users from unauthorized script modifications without
restricting the third-party JavaScript, (4) works without browser modification
or any modification related to the web page visitors, (5) has just an optimum
first load overhead and no impact on performance after initiation, (6) and
thanks to the mathematical scheme, it works as an invulnerable solution
independent of third-party script infection nature.
2. We experimentally demonstrate the performance efficiency of our suggested
method.
3. Evidences will be provided to prove statements by implementing a prototype.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. We mention more details
about the problem background in Section 2. Later, Section 3 is dedicated to
present JSSignature architecture and system design. In Section 4, we will evaluate
performance, security and compatibility of JSSignature. At the end, Section 5
and 6 in order are assigned to review related works and conclusion.
2 PROBLEM STATEMENT
While using third-party-hosted JavaScript resources has become an indispensable
part of millions of websites, it can be considered as a serious threat for the whole
web platform with the currently available measures.
A benign third-party JavaScript provider can be infected by a malicious code
by just injecting a few lines of JavaScript code into a single provided resource.
Consequently, the malicious code will be indirectly injected to all websites those
have included the previously trusted JavaScript resource. The malicious code will
be promptly executed for all the websites visitors. The whole procedure would
happen in real-time for all websites and their users.
2.1 Third-party JavaScript Inclusion
The current security methods in modern web browsers to overcome the third-
party JavaScript security issues are based on a binary strict choice. It means
there are two options for using a third-party script, (1) full isolation by using
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iframe sandboxing, or (2) full access to web page by inclusion of the JavaScript
using script tag.
The former completely isolates the script from accessing to the parent accord-
ing to the SOP or sandbox iframe HTML attributes. Full isolation disregards the
reasons behind using a third-party JavaScript. The vast majority of JavaScript
libraries is implemented to manipulate DOM or other resources of the web page.
Obviously, full isolation of the script is not possible in this case.
The latter option includes third-party JavaScript resource using <script> tag,
and it remains as the only choice to utilize a third-party JavaScript resource. This
paper takes into account including script using <script> tag. This tag grants
a full access of third-party JavaScript to the web page context and execution
environment.
2.2 Possible Attacks
By super strong incentives for the attackers, the third-party JavaScript vendor
is an extremely valuable target. The attacker is able to have access to all data
and functions in a web page through a JavaScript inclusion. Some accessible
data in web pages are: cookies, DOM (e.g., Text and password input values),
JavaScript variables, Web Storage, IndexedDB, etc. To clarify, the attacker would
have access to DOM space, and read all the entered authentication credentials
directly from the login fields. As another simple attack, they can hijack user
session by bypassing web browser Cookie data.
Second major motivating factor is exploiting zero-day vulnerabilities using
malicious scripts. The benign third-party script provider can be used as an attack
vector. Due to the fact that each third-party JavaScript may be used by many
web applications, and each application can have millions of visitors, the target
value as an attack vector is beyond estimation.
A trusted thirty-party JavaScript library can be infected in different ways.
An attacker may (1) gain access to vendor’s hosting and inject malicious script
into the benign JavaScript library, (2) serve his own infected JavaScript instead
of benign script using network attack methods (e.g., DNS hijacking, Domain
hijacking, Domain sniping, Man-in-the-middle attack).
2.3 Requirements
Regarding the wide-spread usage of third-party JavaScript inclusions and consid-
ering serious security issues, the solution should satisfy the following requirements
as essential principles:
a. Invulnerable. Completely eliminate any unauthorized third-party JavaScript
modification. Protecting third-party script end-users from any kind of attack
on the remote script contents (e.g., abusing white-listed policies, browser
vulnerability exploits, the network routing attacks) is a must.
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b. Keep third-party JavaScript advantages. For instance, updating the
third-party JavaScript resource should not force all users to change their
settings (e.g., updating the hash checksum, changing the white-listed policies,
uploading a new version of library). The solution should not set any restriction
for a trusted third-party JavaScript provider, either in the current version or
future developments. On the other hand, a third-party JavaScript must be
loaded from provider’s host to achieve CDN advantages and caching.
c. Efficient performance. Any performance penalty is not acceptable while exe-
cuting the third-party JavaScript code. The performance penalty on JavaScript
resource initialization must be minimum and unnoticeable for the end-user.
d. Backward-compatible. Utilizing a security method must be supported in
all standard browsers without any modification. It should be implementable
in the contemporary web platform without changing infrastructures. It should
be compatible with current JavaScript libraries, without requiring to rewrite
or modify any code.
3 PROPOSED SECURITY SCHEME
In this paper, we exploit digital signatures’ properties to provide a solution for
third-party-hosted JavaScript resources threats. JSSignature brings three proper-
ties as integrity, authentication and non-repudiation to the external JavaScript
inclusions by using digital signature scheme. The website owner is able to
include a trusted or manually reviewed third-party JavaScript without fear of
possible attack against JavaScript provider.
3.1 JSSignature Architectural Overview
JSSignature
Third-party JavaScript
(Signature Included)
Signature Veri!cation
Web Browser
Execute the JavaScript
Preventive
Reaction
veri!ed
failed
Fig. 2. JSSignature diagram. JSSignature verifies the Third-party JavaScript resource
in the client-side before execution using digital signature scheme.
Figure 2 illustrates the scheme of the proposed security method for the use
case of external JavaScript inclusion. The web developer includes a self-hosted
JSSignature library in the web page. Instead of using the script tag to include
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external script, the duty of loading third-party JavaScript resources is assigned
to JSSignature. Thus, JSSignature acts similar to a client-side proxy to load
the third-party JavaScript. It will fetch external script as a plain-text by using
JavaScript functions in the client-side and after validating the content, it decides
if the downloaded script should be executed or not.
3.2 JSSignature Workflow
JSSignature generates the signature to be used by a third-party JavaScript
provider for signing procedure in the following steps: (1) make the hash of
JavaScript content, (2) and create the signature by the asymmetric encryption
of the calculated hash using the private key. The signing procedure should be
done on a separate isolated computer, and not a public server. Therefore, the
private key will be kept securely regardless of servers vulnerability.
JSSignature’s workflow in a visitor’s browser are as the following: (1) fetch
the third-party JavaScript resource as a plain-text, (2) find the signature on the
first line of the downloaded script, (3) decrypt the signature using the public key
which is included in the parent webpage, (4) hash the rest of the script using a
cryptographic hash function, (5) compare calculated hash with the decrypted
signature and decide to execute or go for a preventive reaction (e.g., block script,
run locally hosted copy) based on this comparison.
For legacy support in case the JavaScript provider has not attached a signature
to their script, JSSignature works a bit different: (1) fetch the script, (2) compute
hash, (3) compare computed hash with the hash that the website owner has
specified to decide whether the script is the validated version or not.
There are some other optional features JSSignature can benefit from:
a. Certificate Authorities. There is no technical barriers to transform the
signing procedure and validation check to a Certificate Authority (CA) based
algorithm. It introduces an extra level of security as there is no need to share
the public key securely and separately. Public key can be included in the
signed resource. However, the signing procedure would require CA certificate
issuance cost for the third-party JavaScript provider.
b. Multiple Signatures. Having a JavaScript resource to be signed by different
identities is possible and introduces more extra level of security. For example,
a JavaScript resource can be signed twice by (1) the developer company, (2)
and CDN host provider. In this case, the resource can not compromised even
by disclosing a single identity’s private key.
In this paper, we describe a prototype with essential features in order to validate
the main idea in a less complex procedure.
3.3 Setup Procedure
The developer (website owner) who is intended to enable JSSignature to load
a third-party JavaScript, should follow these steps: (1) download a copy of
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JSSignature and upload it to their host, (2) use JSSignature to load trusted
external scripts by their corresponding valid public keys instead of using script
tags in the web pages.
To utilize JSSignature with all advantages, third-party JavaScript provider is
required to add the signature to its script. The third-party JavaScript provider
follows these steps: (1) sign the provided script by appending the generated
signature string at the first line of the script as a JavaScript comment, (2) and
publish the public key of the provided script to be utilized in script inclusion
using JSSignature.
The website visitor does not need to do a modification. The end-user will not
notice any change in websites those have started using JSSignature.
3.4 Prototype Implementation
JSSignature’s security strength is based on digital signature principle. Therefore,
choosing a right digital signature algorithm and its implementation are essential
to achieve the maximum security.
In our prototype, we have chosen SHA-256 algorithm to generate the script
digest. SHA-256 algorithm is considered as a safe hashing algorithm to be used
in digital signatures at the time of writing this paper. For public-key encryption,
RSA algorithm has been chosen.
However, there are no obstacles to choose other algorithms. The mentioned
algorithms are the cryptographic foundation of the latest version of Transport
Layer Security which is widely-used nowadays on millions of websites as a secure
combination [10].
Digital Signatures Digital signature is a mathematical scheme to indicate
approval of a document. Verification of a signature is possible for anyone, but
signing a document is possible just by one identity who has the secret. Moreover,
validating the integrity of the document is in the nature of this scheme. If
someone changes the signed document, the signature will be no longer valid.
Digital signatures are based on public-key cryptography also known as asymmetric
cryptography. Digital signature concept was proposed by Diffie and Hellman as
equivalent of a written signature [5].
A few years next, Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman invented RSA cryptosystem
and RSA signature which is widely used nowadays. RSA as a practicable asym-
metric cryptosystem uses two distinct keys for encryption and decryption [21].
For signing a large document, it is necessary to produce a short digest and sign it
behalf of the original document to achieve efficiency, integrity and compatibility.
The signed digest will be attached to the document. Digest of document can be
generated using a cryptographic hash algorithm (e.g., MD5, SHA-X, RIPEMD).
In signature verification phase, digest of document will be generated again to be
used in the verification procedure [6].
Digital signature scheme benefits from the following properties: (1) Integrity.
We can make sure the document has not altered compared to the signed version,
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(2) Authentication. The identity who has the secret has signed the document.
It is possible to validate the source of a document, (3) Non-repudiation. The
identity who has signed the document, cannot deny it in the future. It brings
responsibility toward script contents [21].
Majority of cryptography algorithms are already implemented in JavaScript
language and are available with free licenses. In this prototype, CryptoJS [17] as
a custom MIT licensed SHA-256 hashing implementation in JavaScript has been
used. For the asymmetric encryption, RSA algorithm library implementation by
Tom Wu [30] is chosen. There will be no obstacle to choose other implementa-
tions of cryptography algorithms to gain a better performance or for any other
reason. In this prototype, the selection criteria for the cryptography JavaScript
implementations was based on two factors of (1) ease of integration, (2) and
widespreadness. Web Cryptography API is recently introduced as a web browser
feature [28]. It would significantly improve JSSignature performance, reliability
and lower code complexity. However, we have ignored it as it is not still available
wide-spread in all major web browsers on the date of writing this paper.
Fetch the Third-Party JavaScript Resource JSSignature works as a client-
side proxy in loading third-party JavaScript libraries. Therefore, it has to fetch
the remote hosted file in RAW data for further processing and possibly executing
it as a JavaScript code in the web browser. The remote file will be downloaded and
stored in a JavaScript variable by using AJAX requests as a string. AJAX required
functions are working in all modern standard browsers, however, requesting a
resource from a different origin is limited by web browsers.
According to the nature of JSSignature, all its requests are from other domains
those are providing the JavaScript libraries. To enable client-side cross-origin
requests inside web browsers, W3C has introduced Cross-Origin Resource Sharing
(CORS) [25]. At the date of writing this paper, CORS is supported for more than
93% of global web users [3]. CORS must be enabled by the resource provider
by adding an HTTP header. CORS HTTP headers are currently available and
active on hosted JavaScript files in famous JavaScript library CDN providers
such as Google Hosted Libraries and CdnJs.com. Anyway, enabling CORS fetch
for the provided resources is possible for any provider with a straightforward
standard procedure in their web server configurations. To satisfy the legacy
support requirement, JSSignature is able to fetch CORS disabled JavaScript
resources by using a server-side proxy. JSSignature will detect CORS disabled
resources and re-request them through this self-hosted proxy to bypass SOP
limits.
Kernel JSSignature is coded in pure JavaScript and no other libraries except
the mentioned cryptography implementations are included. The whole prototype
has been implemented in a single JavaScript file to make the usage simpler.
<script src="jsSignature.js"></script>
<script>
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var _publicKey = 'nRx8Ifkiw4hTgFL1Xx...';
jsSignature.loadJs(_publicKey, 'http://cdn.example.com/jquery.js');
</script>
JSSignature will fetch the third-party JavaScript resource in the first step.
The fetching function requests the resource in the client-side, and in case of
failure, it would re-request it through the server-side proxy. To vanish the chance
of website failure in case of signature validation problem due to a real threat
or technical problem, it is possible to host a local copy of the trusted library
as an alternative. JSSignature accepts the alternative JavaScript URL as an
optional parameter in loadJs() function. In case of any error, the local script will
be inserted into the page via DOM features as a new script tag.
Next, it reads the first line of the fetched content and extracts signature for
validation check. The signature is included as a JavaScript comment and it does
not impact a legacy inclusion of JavaScript resource.
//JSSignature:RgnNFVQ2zsAtnxwbdcUpT508...
/*! jQuery v2.1.1 */
!function(a,b){... //js content
The extracted signature will be decrypted using the publicly available key. The
rest of the content will be hashed and compared with the decrypted signature to
validate the inclusion. The code scenario is followed by the procedure discussed
in section 3.2.
4 EVALUATION
The principle requirements defined in section 2.3 are assessed and evaluated by
the implemented prototype. The test reports in this paper are limited to a single
third-party JavaScript resource since there is not any technical difference between
additional cases due to the nature of JSSignature technique. Table 1 shows the
comparison between JSSignature and other state of the art proposed methods to
handle the risk.
4.1 Invulnerability
JSSignature security measure is linked to digital signature and cryptography, so it
has a mathematical foundation. JSSignature validates the source and integrity of
the remote JavaScript instead of the script processing. Therefore, any attack to the
benign third-party JavaScript will be mitigated, regardless of the attack nature
or possible JavaScript vulnerabilities. Therefore, this technique is invulnerable
against any kind of threat to the third-party JavaScript resource.
Before validating the JavaScript resource, it loads in the client’s machine
just as a plain-text and it will be executed only after the signature verification.
Consequently, the method cannot be exploited using infected codes or zero-day
vulnerabilities, as it is not considered as JavaScript codes before validation. To
12 K. Nakhaei, E. Ansari and F. Ansari
the best of our knowledge, the breakpoint of JSSignature is same as the digital
signature breakpoint.
The suggested technique brings the following digital signature advantages to
third-party JavaScript resources: (1) Integrity: any unauthorized modification
in the JavaScript resource is not possible. So, the attacker is unable to inject
or update the code. (2) Authentication: the creditable third-party JavaScript
provider has the private key and he is the only individual who can sign a modified
code. (3) Non-repudiation: the creditable third-party JavaScript provider is
unable to do a sinister action by himself, as it brings legal responsibility.
Table 1. A comparision between JSSignature and other state of the art alternative meth-
ods. Compatibility refers to the compatibility with all available third-party JavaScript
libraries and also compatibility with generic web browsers and platforms.
Method Invulnerability Keeping Third-party
JavaScript Advantages
Compatibility
SRI (Subresource Integrity) Yes Partial Partial
CSP (Iframe Isolation) No Partial Partial
COWL No Partial Partial
JSSignature (Our method) Yes Full Full
4.2 Avoiding Losing Third-Party JavaScript Advantages
JSSignature downloads the third-party JavaScript resource directly from the
remote host through the visitor’s web browser. All mentioned advantages of
remote hosted libraries are satisfied within this method: (1) Web browser cache
will be used in case of the existence of the resource in the cache, (2) and as it will
be loaded from the remote host, there is no issue regarding the maintenance cost.
Due to utilizing digital signatures, the third-party provider is able to update
the script regardless of any change in its user’s websites. It is enough to re-sign
the updated script by using the private key and no further action is required.
The new updated resource will be available seamlessly for all the third-party
JavaScript resource users. Therefore, the trusted third-party JavaScript provider
is able to develop its script without any restriction.
4.3 Compatibility
JSSignature is a pure JavaScript library which works inside a webpage without
any additional requirement. As a consequence, JSSignature is operation system
independent and no additional software or browser add-ons are required and will
be fully supported in major web browsers. No modification by the end-user is
required.
Utilizing JSSignature to load a validated version of a third-party JavaScript
resource is possible for all currently available provided libraries. Achieving to
JSSignature: Eliminating Third-Party-Hosted JavaScript Infection Threats... 13
all the discussed technical merits requires the third-party provider to sign the
provided resource with JSSignature structure described in section 3.3. However,
for legacy support, JSSignature is able to check the third-party resource without
a signature and verify it just with the calculated digest of manually reviewed
JavaScript resource. JSSignature does not interfere the included JavaScript code
after the initial signature validation. Consequently, there will be no compatibility
issue or any chance of conflict with available JavaScript libraries. To utilize JSSig-
nature, no code structure modification is required in the third-party JavaScript
resources. Moreover, it does not have any side-effect on other users who are not
utilizing JSSignature to use the inclusion since the included signature is just a
JavaScript comment and it will be ignored by default.
4.4 Performance
Performance report is described in two aspects of loading overhead and run-
time overhead. In continue, the two aspects will be detailed in the respective
subsections. Finally, the performance will be discussed regarding real-world web
application requirements.
Loading Overhead For validation purposes, there is a processing time overhead.
To load a third-party JavaScript securely through JSSignature, it is required
to calculate the SHA-256 of the file, and compare it with the RSA decrypted
signature of it. These two cryptography processes are costly and SHA-256 hashing
overhead is directly related to the third-party JavaScript resource file size. For
performance measuring test case, we have considered the following environment:
a. jQuery as the most famous and a widespread JavaScript library has been
chosen as the third-party hosted JavaScript resource. It is provided by the
majority of well-known free CDN providers such as Google Hosted Libraries.
Moreover, jQuery is one of the heaviest commonly used JavaScript libraries in
both aspects of file size and code complexity. The minified 82.2kb version of
latest jQuery has been used.
b. Test cases have been executed on a personal computer with Intel Core i7-
4702MQ 2.2GHz processor and 16 GiB of DDR3 RAM.
c. Chrome web browser has been used in testing because of the powerful reporting
features and being developer friendly.
To get performance statistics, we have implemented an HTML test page
to load the jQuery library from a remote host through JSSignature with real-
world settings and security checks. The test web page has been reloaded for
1000 times and the loading time has been recorded. To eliminate web browser
content request overhead in measurements, the execution time of JSSignature
after content fetch has been also measured. The total time, including the browser
latency to response the requested file content and executing the validated remote
JavaScript library code is 65ms. The execution time overhead directly related
to JSSignature process is 30ms, which includes the time required for SHA-256
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hashing, extracting the signature from fetched resource, decrypting it by using
public key via RSA algorithm and other functions related to the JSSignature
validation until the requested JavaScript code execution. Table 2 shows the
processing time overheads for all steps.
Table 2. The processing time overhead for the test case script
Factor Time
Library Initialize – including web browser cache reload overhead 5ms
Verification execution overhead 30ms
Total overhead 35ms
Run-Time Overhead JSSignature verifies the third-party JavaScript library
before the execution and it does not alter or control the original script after the
loading. Therefore, the included JavaScript code works without any compatibility
issue or process overhead.
Performance Discussion The most advantage regarding JSSignature perfor-
mance is the lack of any overhead while script execution. This factor is crucial in
modern client-intensive web applications with heavy processes in the client-side.
Any execution overhead because of reference monitoring or altering the original
script can cause serious negative side-effects. Regarding the initial first-time load
process overhead, 35ms total overhead for a jQuery library is satisfying for most
usages. This performance is not only considered efficient in compare to the other
similar solutions, but it also is negligible for real-world usages. Moreover, this
initial overhead can be also optimized by using alternative hashing algorithms or
local caching. JSSignature has a minimal overhead in loading the remote hosted
resource. It causes no overhead after the initial validation and does not have any
performance penalty while executing JavaScript codes.
5 RELATED WORKS
Much of the efforts related to this paper are working on handling the possible
malware in the included JavaScript resource by using language restrictions, type
systems and browser modification. JSSignature presents a different approach
based on digital signatures to validate the source and integrity of the remote
script instead of handling the injected vulnerability.
In-page client-side or server-side script processing. To protect the
web page from the possible threats by a third-party JavaScript resource, several
solutions have been suggested by restricting the third-party JavaScript resource
to a safe subset of trusted code. Techniques such as ADSafe [4] and ADsafety
[19] are validating the untrusted JavaScript codes to be within a safe subset.
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Some approaches such as such Caja [16], GateKeeper [7], Microsoft Web Sandbox
[15] and Jacaranda [8] are re-writing and analyzing the third-party inclusion
in the server-side or by a custom developed browser plugin as an alternative
[15]. In advanced to transforming the JavaScript codes, some techniques such as
BrowserShield [20] are inserting extra checks for possible run-time attacks.
Transforming a JavaScript code has serious disadvantages: (1) the compat-
ibility issue for complicated JavaScript libraries is a concern. Any change in a
JavaScript resource may lead to a failure or a performance issue, and there is no
guarantee if the transformed code is working properly with the same efficiency of
untouched version. (2) Some of the techniques are requiring server-side processing
[8, 15, 16, 20]. Therefore, they will ruin the discussed CDN and client-side caching
advantage of using a third-party resource. Moreover, any server-side process over-
head for a web application is costly, and in a real world web application it is not
feasible in most cases. (3) After all, there is still a chance to abuse whitelisted
JavaScript codes for a sinister purpose.
The suggested technique in this paper will be executed on the client-side and
does not alter the third-party JavaScript. Also, the approach is not about the
included third-party JavaScript functions and codes. Instead, the validation of
the whole included code block will be verified.
Browser modification. Some techniques require a browser modification
to enable protection. Adsentry [31] is implemented as a Firefox add-on, while
ConScript [14], WebJail [23] and Contego [12] are implemented on browser
JavaScript engine to set policies and inline reference monitoring. MashupOS [9]
is a custom web browser which isolates the untrusted inclusions, while allowing
whitelisted communications in the browser level. Policies abuse, tight restrictions
for benign scripts, and possible vulnerabilities are still the drawbacks.
Content Security Policy (CSP) [22] as another approach, introduces a new
HTTP header to be supported by the web browser as a security feature. Based
on this HTTP header, the browser should limit the page resources, including
JavaScript files and resources to the whitelisted origins. It is proposed to protect
the page from sending private information to an unverified origin, and it does not
not prevent policies abuse, and/or other JavaScript vulnerabilities and infections.
An approach based on browser modification has its own advantages and
drawbacks. A browser modification may lead to a better efficiency. However, the
threat would not be mitigated until all the web application visitors do install
the modified web browser which is not practicable. According to the fact that
there are various versions of web browsers in the market, releasing a security
feature as a standard for all these browsers is unfeasible in an acceptable time
period. JSSignature does not require a browser modification. It works with default
browser features in the client-side, and the website owner is able to utilize it
without any update required for the end-users.
Isolating by browser features. Some approaches are suggested based on
browser features for isolating the third-party JavaScript. AdJail [11] uses browser
features for apply access control. It loads the script and whitelisted elements on
a shadow page on another origin to avoid unwanted access based on SOP. Any
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change to an element in the copied version or the original page will be applied
to the other one if policies allow it. Complete isolation is possible by browser
standard features. Recent browsers are supporting sandbox attribute for iframe
elements to block any access from iframe content. Moreover, SOP gives the web
developer to load a script in a web page from another origin with full isolating.
JSand [1] works in the client-side, and it is based on sandboxing principle. It
uses object-capable JavaScript engine in modern web browsers to sandbox and
apply the access control architecture. Like all other similar methods, the policies
setup and abuse is a major concern.
To conclude, these sandboxing techniques are not fully practicable in real-
world use cases for majority of third-party JavaScript libraries. Isolation may make
a third-party JavaScript broken, or at least it sets strict limits for a creditable
third-party JavaScript provider. A third-party JavaScript is included to work
inside the web page and integrate with elements and other JavaScript codes,
and isolation is in contrast with this principle. Also, the policies abuse is always
a concern. On the other hand, their protection method cannot be confidently
verified for all cases and vulnerabilities since their architecture is sensitive to
the included JavaScript codes functionality. Therefore, verifying the protection
against all available codes and zero-day vulnerabilities is unfeasible in similar
methods.
6 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS
A prototype of JSSignature has been implemented and has been evaluated.
The performance benchmarks were satisfying for real-world usages, and security
measures are trustable thanks to the cryptography foundation. This technique is
not based on JavaScript code processing, and instead the source and integrity of
JavaScript inclusion will be verified.
Consequently, it is invulnerable regardless of the infection nature. Generally,
the expected essential requirements of invulnerability, backward compatibility,
avoid losing third-party advantages and acceptable performance penalty have
been satisfied.
To the best of our knowledge, JSSignature is the first technique which protects
the web page from any unauthorized third-party JavaScript resource modification
or any attack to the resource provider, while it does not set any restriction for
the benign provider. However, JSSignature is working based on digital signature
scheme and the provider must be creditable to avoid signing a malicious code
deliberately without the fear of legal responsibility.
In the future, we are intended to add an option to the prototype’s digital
signature algorithm to validate signature through Certificate Authorities to
vanish public key publishing procedure. Moreover, we would like to transform this
technique to a World Wide Web standard to verify all the third-party resources,
and not only limited to the JavaScript resources.
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